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1 **Usable science? The UK Climate Projections 2009**
2 **and decision support for adaptation planning**

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Abstract

17
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19 With future changes in climate inevitable, adaptation planning has become a policy
20 priority. A central element in adaptation planning is scientific expertise and knowledge of
21 what the future climate may hold. The UK Climate Projections 2009 (UKCP09) provide
22 climate information designed to help those needing to plan how to adapt to a changing
23 climate. This paper attempts to determine how useful and usable UKCP09 is for
24 adaptation decision-making. The study used a mixed methods approach that includes
25 analysis of adaptation reports, a quantitative survey and semi-structured interviews with
26 key adaptation stakeholders working in the science-policy interface, which included
27 decision-makers, knowledge producers and knowledge translators. The knowledge
28 system criteria was used to assess the credibility, legitimacy and saliency of UKCP09 for
29 each stakeholder group. It emerged that stakeholders perceived UKCP09 to be credible
30 and legitimate due to its sophistication, funding source and the scientific reputation of
31 organizations involved in UKCP09's development. However, due to inherent
32 complexities of decision-making and a potentially greater diversity in users, UKCP09's
33 saliency was found to be dependent upon the scientific competence and familiarity of the
34 user(s) in dealing with climate information. An example of this was the use of Bayesian
35 probabilistic projections which improved the credibility and legitimacy of UKCP09's
36 science but reduced the saliency for decision-making. This research raises the question of
37 whether the tailoring of climate projections is needed to enhance their salience for
38 decision-making while recognizing that it is difficult to balance the three knowledge
39 criteria in the production of usable science.

40

41 1. Introduction

42 Scientific expertise, knowledge and progress are perceived to be key reference points in
43 policy-making (Braun and Kropp 2010; Kropp and Wagner 2010), making science a
44 fundamental global commodity. In fact within the UK, demand for scientific information
45 to support policy and investment decisions has grown rapidly ever since bold
46 commitments were made in the White Paper, ‘1999 Modernizing Government’, where
47 the UK Government invested significant political currency in evidence-based policy-
48 making (Young et al, 2002; Sutcliffe and Court 2005). Therefore, the need to produce
49 and disseminate comprehensive, robust and trustworthy scientific information to inform
50 policy design is essential (Dilling and Lemos 2011).

51 An emerging policy priority where scientific information is considered to be
52 particularly important for decision-making is adaptation planning (or governance), which
53 in contrast to mitigation, aims to deal with the consequences rather than causes of climate
54 change. Adaptation – “the adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual
55 or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial
56 opportunities” (IPCC 2007, p. 6) – aims to reduce the negative impacts (and exploit any
57 benefits) from actual or expected climatic changes (Fussler 2007).

58 In the UK, adaptation planning emerged as a policy issue in 1997 when the UK
59 Climate Impacts Programme (UKCIP) was established (McKenzie-Hedger *et al.* 2006)
60 and has since risen to greater prominence, particularly with the passing of the Climate
61 Change Act 2008. To achieve this the Act provides the Government with special
62 ‘Adaptation Reporting Powers’ to request ‘bodies with functions of a public nature’ and
63 ‘statutory undertakers’ (e.g. utility companies and harbour authorities) to report on the

64 risks and benefits posed by changes in climate and how they plan to adapt to them (Defra
65 2011a). In addition, the Act requires the Government to undertake a UK-wide Climate
66 Change Risk Assessment every five years (the first assessment of its kind was published
67 on 25th January 2012) to provide an evidence base to help better understand climate
68 change risks and also help inform the development of a National Adaptation Programme
69 (to be published in 2013). However, whilst Government is keen to encourage adaptation
70 action at all levels of society, informed by the best available scientific information,
71 research has identified various obstacles to its effective use in policymaking (see
72 Demeritt and Langdon 2004; Gawith et al 2009; Arnell 2011; Reeder and Ranger 2011).
73 Consequently, it is possible to question the practical usability of science being produced
74 to inform policy and decision-making.

75 The UK has a long history of producing climate change scenarios/projections (see
76 Hulme and Dessai 2008a; 2008b), with the latest disseminated in 2009. Conceived in
77 2003, the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and the
78 Department of Environment and Climate Change (DECC) provided the Met Office (MO)
79 as the lead agency (alongside other organizations) with £11 million to develop state-of-
80 the-art free for use climate projections of future changes in the UK known as UKCP09
81 (UK Climate Projections 2011a). These projections have experienced significant uptake,
82 resulting in its emergence as the “standard benchmark set of climate information in use
83 by the UK impacts and adaptation community” (UKCIP 2011a p. 28). Yet, few
84 observations and assessments have been undertaken to determine the efficacy of that
85 investment and how the information translates into informing decision-making.
86 Therefore, given the Government has requested key infrastructure providers to report on

87 adaptation measures and the significant financial investment in climate projections, it is
88 timely to consider whether, how and why UK climate information is being used to inform
89 adaptation decision-making.

90 This paper utilizes UKCP09 as a case study to investigate the science-policy
91 interface. It will examine if key stakeholders (decision-makers, knowledge producers and
92 knowledge translators) perceive UKCP09 to be usable for adaptation decision-making.
93 The paper consists of the following: Section 2 contextualizes the paper within the
94 science-policy interface literature; Section 3 introduces UKCP09; Section 4 presents the
95 research methods employed; Section's 5 and 6 assess and discuss the findings; and
96 finally, Section 7 identifies a number of conclusions.

97 2. The science-policy nexus

98 *2.a. Modes of science*

99 The traditional method of producing science for policy, mode-1 science (commonly
100 known as the linear model or loading-dock approach) assumes more science will result in
101 better decision outcomes. For example, the quantification and reduction of uncertainties
102 will lead to better decision-making. Yet, attempts at utilizing mode-1 science for policy
103 have experienced variable success, leading a number of researchers to speculate about a
104 'disconnect' between the science produced ostensibly to inform decision-making and
105 actual policy processes (Lemos and Moorhouse 2005; McNie 2007; Sarewitz and Pielke
106 Jr 2007; Dilling and Lemos 2011; Meyer 2011). A commonly referred reason for this
107 disconnect is the realization that mode-1 science is now outdated because it makes "a
108 number of unsubstantiated assumptions about the resources, capabilities and motivations

109 of research users” (Eden 2011, p. 12); that the science produced is expected and
110 presumed to be useful (and usable) to help intended recipients (and society) address
111 problems they may face (Dilling 2007a).

112 However, crucially, research has shown a whole range of contextual and intrinsic
113 factors affect decision-making, including: informal and formal institutional barriers; what
114 the decision and policy goals are; the information’s spatial and time scale resolution;
115 level of skill required to utilize the information; and level of trust, among others (Cash *et*
116 *al.* 2003; Lemos and Morehouse 2005; Dilling 2007a; McNie 2007; Sarewitz and Pielke
117 Jr 2007; Hulme and Dessai 2008b; Kirchhoff 2010; Lemos and Rood 2010; Dilling and
118 Lemos 2011; Eden 2011). Therefore, in essence, mode-1 science oversimplifies the
119 complexities within the science-policy interface.

120 Consequently, alternate models and relationships have been suggested that
121 emphasize and recognize the need for stronger linkages between science and society, in
122 order for science to more effectively assist decision-making. Though different in their
123 details, “mode-2” (Nowotny *et al.* 2001; Lemos and Morehouse 2005), “post-normal”
124 (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993) or “use-inspired” (Stokes 1997 cited in Dilling 2007b)
125 science all aim to improve the connection between supply and demand by being socially
126 distributive, application-orientated, trans-disciplinary, and subject to multiple
127 accountabilities by encouraging knowledge producers to consider the social, physical,
128 institutional and political context of decision-makers (Cash and Buizer 2005; Dilling
129 2007a; McNie 2007; Sarewitz and Pielke Jr 2007). Effective decision support emerges
130 when the information decision-makers’ need is identified and aligned alongside with
131 what is feasible for science to deliver (NRC, 2009).

132 Furthermore, the creation of ‘boundary organizations’ and ‘boundary objects’
133 helps improve the usability of science by linking science and policy across different
134 levels. This is achieved by facilitating a better exchange between stakeholders creating
135 the science (knowledge producers) and stakeholders writing the policies (decision-
136 makers) through enhanced emphasis on iteration and interaction (Guston 1999; Cash
137 2001; Lemos and Morehouse 2005; Kirchhoff 2010; Dilling and Lemos 2011).

138 Despite the principles and arguments for mode-2 science, doubt remains over the
139 usability of information produced due to difficulties in addressing the contextual and
140 intrinsic factors that affect decision-making and different actors perceiving the usefulness
141 of scientific information differently (Lemos and Rood 2010). In addition, it has been
142 suggested that science has moved beyond the capabilities of societal understanding and
143 implementation (McNie 2007; Tribbia and Moser 2008; Braun and Kropp 2010), since
144 more accurate science does not necessarily make decisions easier. Hence, it has become
145 “a sociological truism today that a greater supply of knowledge will not ensure a greater
146 degree of certainty in decision-making” (Kropp and Wagner 2010, p. 813). Therefore,
147 although the theory implies science produced in this manner will be more practical and
148 usable for decision-makers, in practice it remains hard to distinguish what constitutes
149 better (usable) science.

150 *2.b. Knowledge system criteria for usable science*

151 A number of researchers have suggested science for policy needs to be considered
152 holistically as a knowledge system consisting of three quality criterion (Cash *et al.* 2003;
153 Cash and Buizer 2005; McNie 2007). Specifically, for scientific information to be useful
154 and usable, decision-makers must perceive it “to not only be *credible*, but also *salient* and

155 *legitimate*” (Cash *et al.* 2003, p. 8086); where they simultaneously perceive the
156 information’s technical evidence and arguments to be scientifically sound, relevant to
157 their needs, and produced (and distributed) in an unbiased transparent conduct that
158 considered among other factors potential opposing views, values and beliefs (Cash *et al.*
159 2003; Hulme and Dessai 2008b; Munang *et al.* 2011).

160 In order for scientific information to exude these criteria, each criterion must
161 consist of various distinctive characteristics decision-makers recognize. For instance,
162 information is likely to be deemed credible if the science is accurate, valid, of high
163 quality, supported by some form of peer-review, and funded from a recognizable or
164 established institution(s). To ensure the information is legitimate, it must have been
165 produced and disseminated in a transparent, open and observable way that is free from
166 political suasion or bias. To be salient, information must appear context-sensitive and
167 specific to the demands of a decision-maker across ecological, spatial, temporal and
168 administrative scales.

169 However, stakeholders generally have different perceptions of what makes
170 credible, legitimate and salient information (Cash *et al.* 2003; Lemos and Morehouse
171 2005; Lemos and Rood 2010; Dilling and Lemos 2011). As a result, the criteria cannot
172 simply be incorporated without case specific consideration of the user(s). Difficulties
173 arise from two complex linkages between the criteria. Firstly if the science is perceived to
174 be seriously lacking in any of the criteria, its likelihood of producing influential
175 information falls significantly; and secondly due to tight tradeoffs amongst the criteria,
176 efforts to enhance one succeed at the expense of the (an)other(s), undermining the
177 information’s overall influence (Cash *et al.* 2003; Cash and Buizer 2005).

178 In spite of these difficulties, the knowledge system criteria is a good indicator to assess
179 stakeholders' perspectives of what constitutes usable science because it considers the
180 entire process (from inception to dissemination) of the science in question. Indeed
181 credibility can be used to assess stakeholders' perceptions of the quality of science
182 underpinning the disseminated information; legitimacy can assess stakeholders'
183 perceptions of the level of transparency and bias of the individuals and institutions
184 involved in its development; while saliency directly assesses stakeholders' perceptions of
185 its relevancy to their needs and requirements.

186 3. UK Climate Projections 2009

187 Climate change projections (or scenarios) are increasingly visible in national and
188 international public policy debates. Based upon peer-reviewed science, projections
189 provide quantitative or semi-quantitative descriptions of possible future climates that
190 carry considerable authority. Projections are conditional upon the emission scenario
191 considered.

192 In the UK, the first Government funded scenarios were published in 1991. Five
193 generations later, the latest suite of projections, 'UKCP09' (released in June 2009),
194 represents seven years work by a consortium of organizations including Defra, UKCIP
195 and MO. UKCP09 provides projections of future changes in climate compared to a 1961-
196 1990 baseline. These projections were "purposefully designed to meet the needs of a
197 wide range of people who will want to assess potential impacts of the projected future
198 climate and explore adaptation options to address those impacts" (UK Climate
199 Projections 2011b). In order to achieve this, UKCP09 delivered of a wealth of climate
200 information, including: a briefing report; climate change land projections (e.g. variables

201 of temperature and precipitation); marine and coastal projections (e.g. variables of storm
202 surge and sea-level changes); observed trends in climate data; weather generator; and 11-
203 member regional climate model output ensemble (Jenkins *et al.* 2009; Street *et al.* 2009;
204 UKCIP 2011a) and more recently (April 2012) spatially coherent projections and a newer
205 version of the weather generator.

206 Compared to previous projections, UKCP09 offers users much greater detail and
207 complexity. For example, for the first time, climate projections quantify uncertainties
208 explicitly in a probabilistic fashion; the 25km (instead of 50km) grid squares provide
209 greater spatial resolution, as do pre-defined aggregated areas which offer more
210 specialized climate information for administrative regions, river basins and some marine
211 regions. In addition, UKCP09's management process encouraged greater input from
212 decision-makers through the creation of a User Panel to ensure a wide range of opinions
213 were considered and produce the most comprehensive package of climate information.

214 UKCP09 offers users more functionality than ever before. For instance, decision-makers
215 can now assign probabilities to different future climate outcomes (conditional on the
216 selected emission scenario); they can reflect on the uncertainties of data in more detail;
217 and UKCP09's User Interface allows data to be visualized and interrogated to produce
218 maps and graphs or be downloaded as numerical outputs, thus providing specific
219 extraction and manipulation of data. However, like any suite of climate information
220 various uncertainties exist (modelling uncertainty, natural climate variability and
221 emissions uncertainty; for more information see Jenkins *et al.* 2009). Furthermore using
222 probabilistic projections is not without controversy, since the type of probability used,
223 Bayesian, is not necessarily the type decision-makers are familiar with or want (Dessai

224 and Hulme 2004; Stainforth *et al* 2007). Bayesian projections are often less favoured by
225 decision-makers because of their difficulty in practical application which encourage a
226 less robust decision-making approach (Smith *et al.* 2009; Arnell 2011; Reeder and
227 Ranger 2011).

228 4. Methods

229 In order to assess the usability of UKCP09, research focused on the perceptions of three
230 distinct groups of adaptation stakeholders. These were ‘knowledge producers’ involved
231 in developing or conducting academic research with UKCP09 or predecessor projections;
232 ‘knowledge translators’ providing specialist, consultancy services to organizations
233 responsible for adaptation planning and policy-making; and ‘decision-makers’ within
234 organizations with adaptation duties.

235 Data collection involved a mixed methods approach combining an online
236 questionnaire, semi-structured interviews and content analysis of 95 ‘Adaptation Reports’
237 which were produced in response to the Adaptation reporting power. These reports were
238 written by a range of stakeholders including benchmark organizations⁽ⁿ⁼⁸⁾ (e.g.,
239 Environment Agency and Network Rail), Water⁽ⁿ⁼²¹⁾, Electricity generators⁽ⁿ⁼⁹⁾,
240 Electricity distributors and transmitters⁽ⁿ⁼⁸⁾, Gas transporters⁽ⁿ⁼⁷⁾, Road and rail⁽ⁿ⁼⁴⁾,
241 Ports⁽ⁿ⁼⁹⁾, aviation⁽ⁿ⁼¹⁰⁾, Lighthouse authority⁽ⁿ⁼¹⁾, Regulators⁽ⁿ⁼⁷⁾, and Public bodies⁽ⁿ⁼¹¹⁾
242 (see Defra 2011b for a full list of published reports). Content analysis focused on how
243 UKCP09 was utilized.

244 The survey used a mixture of open-ended, single and multi-fixed response, and
245 agreement-scaling questions to explore perceptions of UKCP09 and collect basic
246 demographic data. For example, respondents were asked if they had created an adaptation

247 report, whether they had utilized UKCP09 for that report and why, and if they associated
248 the terms credible, legitimate and salient with UKCP09.

249 In the summer of 2011, 130 decision-makers were emailed (FIG. 1) with follow-
250 up emails after three and five weeks, and a direct call after week six. The survey universe
251 was compiled in two ways. 80 were selected from organizations included under the
252 'Adaptation Reporting Power' (Defra 2011c). An additional 50 were chosen to represent
253 those sectors not requested by Defra to produce an adaptation report but whose functions
254 (which have a public interest) are likely to be affected by changes in climate.
255 Furthermore, they were selected on the size of the organization and region they manage.

256 The response rate was 25% (n=33/130). Survey responses were initially entered
257 into a spreadsheet for cross-tabulation and further statistical analysis. Nominal and
258 ordinal coding was performed to help quantify responses and identify patterns. Cross-
259 tabulation between sectors was performed in order to draw comparisons between sectoral
260 perceptions of UKCP09.

261 A follow-up round of interviews conducted with all three stakeholder groups
262 explored in more detail findings emerging from the questionnaire survey. For example,
263 stakeholders were asked if they were familiar with science like UKCP09, whether they
264 had extensively used UKCP09 (how, why and what for), if they required expert help to
265 utilize UKCP09, if they were aware of other sources (and had they used them), and
266 whether communicating known sources of uncertainties and some information as
267 Bayesian projections affected the usability of UKCP09.

268 Whereas decision-maker interviewees were identified through the survey,
269 knowledge producers were identified from published lists of contributors to the

270 development of UKCP09 development (i.e. UK Climate Projections 2011c; UKCIP
271 2011b) websites, while knowledge translators were identified from a web-based search
272 (on Google Scholar). All individuals were contacted initially via email, with follow up
273 emails after two and four weeks (no direct follow up calls were undertaken). Table 1
274 illustrates our interview sample, including each interviewee's area of expertise, employer
275 sector and relationship to UKCP09 (self-assessed).

276 Interviews were taped and transcribed verbatim. Following transcription, content
277 analysis was applied to identify response themes. The theme categorization used was
278 based on the knowledge system criteria (credibility, legitimacy and saliency). Stakeholder
279 groups were initially analyzed on their own and then compared to the two other groups.

280 To ensure individual and group perception consistency, decision-makers' survey and
281 interview responses were compared, and then additionally cross-referenced against their
282 relevant Adaptation Report, which were collected from Defra's website (Defra 2011b).
283 Such methodological triangulation helped assure the quality of the research and the
284 robustness of our interpretation of our findings (Olsen 2004; Guion *et al.* 2011).

285 5. Results

286 *5.a. Initial decision-maker perceptions of UKCP09*

287 Of the 33 respondents 24 had created or were creating an adaptation report, with nine of
288 these employing commercial (e.g., Jan Brooke Consulting and Met Office Consulting) or
289 non-commercial (e.g., UKCIP) consultants and 'knowledge translators' to assist in the
290 preparation of their adaptation reports. Of these 24 decision-makers, 21 utilized UKCP09

291 representing five sectors: Water (n=7), Transport (n=6), Local and Regional Authority
292 (n=2), Environment (n=3), and Energy (n=3).

293 These decision-makers were asked to select one reason ('It was the best option',
294 'Recommended to', 'No alternative', 'Other') for why they chose to utilize UKCP09 in
295 their adaptation report. Responses indicated 10 of 21 utilized UKCP09 because 'It was
296 the best option', four were 'Recommended to' use it, two felt 'No alternative' existed,
297 and five provided alternate reasons which were positive in nature; for example, 'UKCP09
298 is the most up-to-date sophisticated projections' and 'UKCP09 supplemented information
299 previously developed'. Amongst these decision-makers, UKCP09 has a positive
300 reputation and is perceived to be an important source of information. Indeed, analysis of
301 published Adaptation Reports indicates the majority utilized UKCP09 in their report.
302 Analysis also highlighted several additional reasons for why UKCP09 was utilized,
303 including: it represented an updated version of previous projections with advancements in
304 knowledge and information; it provides the tools to undertake quantitative options
305 analysis; it is the most definitive evidence base on the UK's future climate; and it is
306 perceived as a highly reliable data set.

307 In terms of the three non-users of UKCP09, unfortunately they did not provide
308 direct reasons for why they did not utilize the projections however, one respondent noted
309 that instead they used a combination of information sources consisting of the UKCIP
310 Local Climate Impacts Profile (LCLIP), a self-administered media trawl and various local
311 case studies from local officers.

312 *5.b. Credibility and legitimacy*

313 Survey and interview responses indicate UKCP09 is perceived as credible and legitimate.
314 For example, decision-makers were asked in the survey to choose how much they agreed
315 ('Not at all', 'A little', 'Moderately', 'Quite a bit', 'Extremely', 'No opinion') with using
316 the terms 'Credible' and 'Legitimate' to describe utilization of UKCP09. Results
317 indicate, primarily UKCP09 is described as 'Quite a bit' credible (63%) and legitimate
318 (52%), whilst 26% and 37% chose to describe UKCP09 as 'Extremely' credible and
319 legitimate, respectively.

320 It also emerged that stakeholders perceived the two criteria to be overlapping
321 concepts and difficult, in practice, to distinguish from one another. For example,
322 Decision-maker B ran two concepts together in discussing the open communication of
323 uncertainties:

324

325 *"I think it's more credible because it's a realistic and honest approach"*

326 (Decision-maker B).

327

328 Decision-maker B denotes credibility through the use of 'realistic' (which is a synonym
329 for credible) and legitimacy through the use of 'honest' which implies they perceived the
330 process to be open due to the explicit discussion of uncertainties. Therefore, while in
331 theory credibility and legitimacy are distinct, in practice they are perceived to be so
332 closely intertwined that the typology is hard to use.

333 Stakeholder groups provided different reasons for why they judged UKCP09 to be
334 credible and legitimate. Decision-makers tended to stress the importance of UKCP09
335 being government funded and nationally (and internationally) recognized.

336

337 *It's essential that it's a national thing. It's credible that it's endorsed by those*
338 *various different organizations and used uniformly. I think it's really key"*
339 (Decision-maker B).

340

341 Decision-makers believed other information sources, without government approval, were
342 not as credible and legitimate:

343

344 *"Actually I don't see much point in getting another tool that doesn't have the UK*
345 *Government stamp of approval on it"* (Decision-maker A).

346

347 This perception of government approval resulted in decision-makers considering
348 UKCP09 to represent '*a common framework*' for all sectors to utilize when assessing
349 future climate risks. Decision-makers perceived that by utilizing something that is
350 nationally accepted (e.g. UKCP09) their results will be accepted by and compliant with
351 the demands of the government regulator, like the Environment Agency:

352

353 *"...let's say we're doing some kind of project that requires Environment Agency*
354 *sign off and approval. If you're actually using a tool that isn't actually nationally*
355 *recognized, then you have to go through this process or persuasion of what*

356 *you've actually got is fit for the job. If you've got something that actually is*
357 *nationally accepted, the results are accepted, processes of using it are accepted,*
358 *then actually what it means is that from our perspective the processes go a lot*
359 *smoother”* (Decision-maker A).

360

361 For this decision-maker, it was the credibility of UKCP09 with the regulator that
362 mattered. Its scientific reputation was less important than the promise that the resulting
363 adaptation would meet with regulatory approval from government. That was echoed by
364 others:

365

366 *“Using UKCP09 also allows Defra and anyone else to compare plans across the*
367 *water industry and other industry's plans if required”* (Decision-maker J).

368

369 This touches on Rothstein *et al.* (2006) argument about institutional risks, that failure to
370 utilize science, in this case UKCP09, allows for the creation of blame, accountability and
371 reputational damage. However, if decision-makers do include the science, and the risk
372 still occurs, adapting organizations are at least safeguarded against the most extreme
373 socio-political criticisms. Therefore, by using UKCP09 decision-makers are minimizing
374 their institutional exposure.

375 In contrast, credibility and legitimacy for knowledge producers and knowledge
376 translators emerged from the incorporation of Bayesian probabilistic projections which
377 they perceived as enhancing scientific accuracy and validity. Specifically, they perceived
378 Bayesian projections encourage uncertainties to be further explored and/or allow

379 uncertainties to be accommodated for in adaptation planning. We found a belief that
380 using UKCP09 should lead to better decisions (consistent with the linear model of
381 science):

382

383 *“I think it [Bayesian probabilistic projections] enhances credibility. Importantly,*
384 *it makes people realize the inherent uncertainties and should lead to better*
385 *planning”* (Knowledge producer H).

386

387 Significantly, this difference between stakeholder groups’ (decision-makers to
388 knowledge producers and knowledge translators) reasons for why they perceive UKCP09
389 to be credible and legitimate begins to raise wider implications for the knowledge system
390 criteria. In particular it indicates that stakeholders are likely to consider what makes
391 UKCP09 usable for decision-making differently, an issue which has been raised in
392 previous research (Cash *et al.* 2003; Lemos and Morehouse 2005; Lemos and Rood 2010;
393 Dilling and Lemos 2011). Furthermore, this points to some important underlying
394 differences in the understandings of the applications of climate information and thus of
395 the saliency of UKCP09 for decision-making.

396 *5.c. Saliency*

397 Unlike credibility and legitimacy, perception of saliency is less consistent amongst
398 stakeholders. Decision-makers, in particular, were split in how they described UKCP09’s
399 saliency. When asked in the survey to choose how much they agreed with using the term,
400 14% chose ‘A little’, 33% chose ‘Moderately’, 33% chose ‘Quite a bit’, 14% chose
401 ‘Extremely’, and 6% had ‘No opinion’. In addition, the range indicates perception of

402 saliency is less positive than credibility and legitimacy, as 47% of saliency responses
403 were positive (33% quite a bit, 14% extremely) whereas 89% of responses were positive
404 for both credibility (63% quite a bit, 26% extremely) and legitimacy (52% quite a bit,
405 37% extremely). Notably this variation is also shown in a sectoral comparison.
406 Specifically, in terms of modal response, 42% of the Water sector felt UKCP09 was
407 ‘Extremely’ salient, 67% of Energy and 100% of Environment perceived it was ‘Quite a
408 bit’ salient, 83% of Transport perceived it was ‘Moderately’ salient, while Local
409 Authority responses were split equally between ‘A little’ (50%) and ‘Moderately’ (50%).

410 When pressed further on the issue during interviews, decision-makers stressed the
411 complexity of UKCP09 and the difficulties of using its raw outputs in decision-making.
412 The below quotation is typical of the views expressed by four decision-makers:

413

414 *“...in terms of creating our adaptation report and adaptation strategy there was*
415 *less using of UKCP[09]’s outputs and more using of the stuff that is there in the*
416 *maps that is used for public consumption rather than any sort of raw data that*
417 *comes from UKCP[09]” (Decision-maker F).*

418

419 Instead of using the full technical capabilities of UKCP09 that so impressed knowledge
420 producers, decision-makers preferred simply to borrow from heavily digested summary
421 reports that were less complex (e.g., 67% used the land projections and only 19% used
422 the spatial coherent projections). This tendency was also demonstrated through analysis
423 of the Adaptation Reports. For example, Manchester Airport Group (2011) believed the
424 inclusion of certain specific variables of temperature and precipitation data, such as

425 relative humidity and cloud amount, would have introduced unnecessary complexity for
426 their planning. Similarly, as Severn Trent Water Ltd. (2011, p. 48) put it, “*the UKCP09*
427 *data and tools are so wide ranging it is difficult to know which is the best method / tool /*
428 *dataset to use*”.

429 Additionally, Adaptation Report analysis highlighted, in spite of UKCP09 being
430 perceived as invaluable in helping planning, it did not provide the specific information
431 they directly required. A number of reports (see National Grid gas 2010; London Stansted
432 2011; Port of Sheerness 2011; and SP Energy Networks 2011) commented that UKCP09
433 lacked useful information concerning the frequency and intensity of ice storms, wind
434 (direction and speed), snow storms, lightning storms, heat waves and droughts. A view
435 held even in light of the (November 2010) UKCIP published technical notes (UKCIP
436 2012a; 2012b) – provide additional advice on these variables – as decision-makers
437 perceived data from these was not easy to extract. A few examples include:

- 438 • Severn Trent Water Ltd. (2011, p. 39) stating they could not assess the impact of
439 summer convective storm events on sewer systems because there are limitations
440 in predicting the intensity and frequency of such events whilst using UKCP09;
- 441 • SP Generation (2011, p. 13) criticised the Weather Generator’s usability, stating it
442 did not constitute “a profound extreme event analysis suitable to assess the change
443 in likelihood of extreme events in the future”;
- 444 • And, RWE Npower (2011, p. 16) concerns that estimations for the implications of
445 the UKCP09 projections on the ‘aquatic environment’ are not available.
446 Therefore, resulting in the overreliance on the autonomous (and resource

447 consuming) implementation of supplementary models (such as a rainfall-runoff
448 model).

449 Besides the lack of salience, some of these statements also point towards a perceived lack
450 of credibility, because UKCP09 is seen as weak in certain areas (e.g., summer convective
451 storms). Furthermore this highlights an apparent contradiction amongst decision-makers,
452 who on the one hand complain about the complexity yet on the other hand state it leaves
453 out information they require; thus showing the difficulties in appeasing a range and
454 variety of decision-makers. Nevertheless, it must also be noted that it is extremely
455 difficult to produce data concerning weather variables such as wind, snow and lightning
456 storms because these events are fraught with uncertainty. This is a universal shortcoming
457 in what science can currently offer, thus is not uniquely indicative of UKCP09.

458 Our findings also suggest that the information UKCP09 provides is one or two
459 steps removed from what decision-makers want or need. This is unsurprising, given that
460 UKCP09 is climate information and not the impact information some decision-makers
461 would like, an issue directly mentioned by four decision-makers and exemplified by the
462 following quotation:

463

464 *“Within our risk assessments the information I need is not climate information it’s*
465 *environmental impact information”* (Decision-maker D).

466

467 Arguably, UKCP09 has a saliency gap in the knowledge it can actually provide for
468 decision-making; a finding consistent with emerging research from the sectors, in

469 particular the water and building services industries (see Arnell 2011; Mylona 2012
470 respectively).

471 Why UKCP09 has a saliency (and not a credibility and legitimacy) gap can partly
472 be attributed to the incorporation of Bayesian projections, which result in much greater
473 complexity and information richness. Although many interviewed stakeholders (68%)
474 perceive that the inclusion of such information enhances scientific credibility
475 (abovementioned in Section 5.b), they perceived the information produced is difficult to
476 integrate successfully into decision-making and moves the individual away from a
477 decision. For example, knowledge producers and knowledge translators, who like the
478 arguments of Dessai and Hulme (2004), Smith *et al.* (2009), Arnell (2011) and Reeder
479 and Ranger (2011), believe decision-makers are familiar with a different type of
480 probability that is less complex to interpret and apply. The below quotation is
481 representative of this perception for five knowledge producers' and two knowledge
482 translators':

483

484 *"All the probabilistic estimates they did are all very difficult to interpret because*
485 *they are not probabilities in the way that a decision-making would use*
486 *probabilities"* (Knowledge producer D).

487

488 Considering the above quotation and similar responses there is a perception within the
489 scientific community that Bayesian projections place decision-makers into a decision-
490 making arena with which they are somewhat unfamiliar. Subsequently this demonstrates
491 an ongoing disconnect in the science-policy interface between what scientists produce

492 and what users want or require, creating wider challenges for end users (Shackley and
493 Wynne 1995; Knorr-Cetina 1999). For example, the assessment of climate risk becomes
494 time consuming because thousands of Bayesian projections often serve as an input to
495 impact models (which have their own uncertainties) in order to derive more decision
496 relevant information (cf. Dessai and Hulme 2007). The challenge is compounded by the
497 fact that whoever undertakes the research is usually not the same individual that makes
498 the decision; since typically the actual decision-maker is someone from senior
499 management who does not understand the science in great detail (or is not used to dealing
500 with a probabilistic framework) and due to time constraints, wants one answer instead of
501 several possible outcomes to choose from. Therefore, although decision-makers reflected
502 that having a range of outcomes was useful in highlighting uncertainty, in reality they
503 actually bemoaned how this proliferation tended to complicate decision-making.

504

505 *“UKCIP02 gave you a figure, whereas UKCP09 uses this probabilistic approach*
506 *which I think is a more realistic approach, but in itself trying to write those in a*
507 *report to your management team is hard. You struggle sometimes with making*
508 *decisions with that variability, but that's the reality, they [management] still want*
509 *to know a figure”* (Decision-maker B).

510

511 Decision-maker B reaffirms the widespread perception amongst sampled stakeholder
512 groups, that Bayesian projections reduce the capacity for decision-making. In addition,
513 Decision-maker B iterates the view that senior management is unwilling to consider a
514 range of possible outcomes when trying to make cost-effective adaptation strategy

515 decisions. Therefore, although decisions made are perceived to be more robust and
516 realistic, the actual decision-making process is considered to be harder and less engaging
517 to decision-makers needs.

518 This highlights wider implications for the science-policy interface. Firstly,
519 effective decision-making (for adaptation planning) is not only limited by the science
520 available but also partly by subconscious barriers organizations have constructed through
521 institutional self-governance. For example, traditional use and overreliance on
522 deterministic information to make decisions has resulted in senior management's
523 reluctance to make decisions that have multiple potential outcomes because they are used
524 to only having to consider one outcome. Significantly this finding supports the sentiments
525 of Demeritt and Langdon (2004), and Dilling and Lemos (2011) that the science-policy
526 interface is severely impacted by an informal and formal institutional barrier. Secondly,
527 responses indicate calls for flexibility in decision-making – which would permit
528 adaptation strategies to be scaled up, or scaled back, as conditions dictate (Lemos and
529 Morehouse 2005; Reeder and Ranger 2011) – have yet to be listened to nor subsequently
530 implemented in practice. This implies decision-making is still being undertaken through a
531 linear approach regardless of its negative perception within research spheres, and the
532 promotion of alternate approaches (mode-2 science).

533 This leads us to consider the science of UKCP09, in particular the use of Bayesian
534 projections, is not solely to blame for the perceived lack of saliency decision-makers (and
535 other stakeholder groups) feel. The individual's ability to interpret the data (from the
536 Bayesian projections) and willingness to utilize new methods also affect perceived

537 saliency. A quote from Decision-maker D supports this assessment of cognitive capacity
538 gaps among decision-makers in utilizing the information:

539

540 *“I think the problem that many people have in terms of decisions-makers; they*
541 *can’t articulate a policy question in a way that makes it easy to interpret that*
542 *information. ... There is a real gap between the way policy questions are framed*
543 *and the way that scientists and experts need to articulate those questions to use*
544 *something like [UK]CP09”* (Decision-maker D).

545

546 Notably according to this response, *who* the user is has a major influence on how salient
547 UKCP09 appears. Specifically, we found the user’s familiarity in dealing with climate
548 information and whether they had been scientifically trained affected perceptions of
549 saliency. In fact when knowledge producers and knowledge translators reflected on their
550 applications of UKCP09 and what made the projections usable to them, the majority
551 (circa to 80% of combined sample) referred in some way to their scientific training,
552 background and familiarity. For example, Knowledge producer E recognized the value
553 and advantage of being closely involved in its development:

554

555 *“Yeah [it was difficult to interpret the information I used], though I’ve been*
556 *involved with the background of UKCP09 for the last 5-6 years so I roughly*
557 *understand what it’s about. ... I think it’s virtually impossible for somebody*
558 *relatively new to pick it up and apply it”* (Knowledge producer E).

559

560 Subsequently, they naturally perceived that decision-makers who are familiar with
561 climate information and are scientifically trained (e.g. underwent training from experts or
562 educated to the level of PhD) would be able to utilize the projections more effectively.

563

564 *“It’s an enormous amount of information for somebody who is not normally*
565 *dealing with that sort of thing allied with dealing with issues of understanding*
566 *probability and all that kind of malarkey, you know it’s quite indigestible if your*
567 *coming in cold”* (Knowledge translator A).

568

569 Significantly three decision-makers acknowledged this perception:

570

571 *“I think if you have a scientific background you are used to using this type of data*
572 *or the methodologies. If you’re not used to it, then it is harder”* (Decision-maker
573 G).

574

575 Hence, our findings suggest saliency of UKCP09 is enhanced as a user’s level of
576 familiarity and scientific competence increases. To a degree this is additionally supported
577 by survey results as no mid-range decision-makers (stated they required medium detailed
578 information) perceived UKCP09 to be ‘Hard’ to use unlike 33% of low-end decision-
579 makers (stated they required low detailed information) that did. The range of decision-
580 makers able to utilize science effectively for policy is therefore narrow, which has wider
581 implications for the science-policy interface given that increasing numbers of decision-
582 makers are using scientific information for purposes other than pure research (UKCIP

583 2006; Gawith *et al.* 2009). A trend that is broadening the user community, causing
584 diversity to replace narrowness.

585 6. Discussion: Interactions of the Knowledge System 586 Criteria and the Implications for the science-policy 587 interface

588 Stakeholder responses further emphasize the tight tradeoffs observed by Cash *et al.*
589 (2003), where enhances in one criteria affect the ability of (an)other(s). For example,
590 stakeholders perceived the incorporation of Bayesian style projections increased the
591 credibility and legitimacy of the science, yet also perceived their inclusion reduced the
592 saliency for decisions. With improvements in UKCP09's credibility apparently coming at
593 the expense of saliency, this raises wider questions for the production of science for
594 policy. For instance, how do you decide on which technique to use that satisfies all three
595 criteria? Should more emphasis be placed on one criterion over another? And how do you
596 reconcile the supply and demand of scientific information between knowledge producers
597 and decision-makers?

598 Tradeoffs are not the only implication to consider. This study additionally
599 highlights perceived saliency is also largely affected by who the user is. Indeed for many
600 decision-makers the science may be too advanced or not salient enough for them to make
601 sensible decisions (McNie 2007; Sarewitz and Pielke 2007; Tribbia and Moser 2008), a
602 problem recognized by the following quotation which is representative of four knowledge
603 producers and two knowledge translators:

604

605 *“If there are people who need to know a little bit about what’s going to happen,*
606 *then I’d say yes definitely use it. If there are people who actually wanted to do*
607 *some data analysis with it and some modelling work I’d say yes you can use it but*
608 *use some other sources as well”* (Knowledge producer D).

609

610 Knowledge producer D affirms the view that although the data set is varied, due to the
611 diversity of users and uses, there is a lack of specific guidance on how to use the data for
612 different types of risks, resulting in reduced usability and potential misuse of information.
613 This implies the science-policy interface is still lacking the right level of support
614 information Gawith *et al.* (2009) called for. Therefore, despite Defra’s intention of
615 UKCP09 being developed with a range of *uses* in mind, in reality its usability is limited.

616 Arguably this issue is amplified by a mismatch of expectations between what
617 contributing scientists were developing and what Defra intended to receive from its
618 investment. Given how much UKCP09 cost to develop, it is not unreasonable to assume
619 Government stressed to Defra that they must make good on their investment. In their
620 ‘Statutory Guidance to Reporting Authorities’ Defra (2009), although not directly stated,
621 strongly imply that organizations (many of whom were reporting on adaptation measures
622 officially for the first time) should consider utilizing the projections (as a component of
623 the methodology) to help assess the impacts of climate change to their functions. For
624 instance, under the heading *“What evidence is available about the future climate?”* Defra
625 (2009, p. 8) only explicitly discusses UKCP09, with other pertinent information only
626 briefly mentioned in a supporting capacity. By Defra placing this implicit emphasis on
627 utilizing UKCP09 they inadvertently steer decision-makers to utilize it when other

628 sources of information may have been more relevant. One decision-maker whilst
629 reflecting on others use of UKCP09 said:

630

631 *“[UK]CP09 is not the first place for them to start, so they need someone to*
632 *translate that into something more relevant for them”* (Decision-maker D).

633

634 While another went as far to say:

635

636 *“...I think if we didn’t make any reference to it then you would have to wonder*
637 *why. I think therefore the reader would wonder why we haven’t made reference to*
638 *it and would probably think it’s more carelessness on our part than a failing of*
639 *UKCP09”* (Decision-maker F).

640

641 These quotations imply that amongst some decision-makers there is wariness in using
642 UKCP09; suggesting UKCP09 is in danger of becoming a constant or ‘rite of passage’
643 that must be included when writing adaptation reports. Perhaps inadvertently, the
644 government has created a perception amongst decision-makers that UKCP09 is the only
645 ‘game in town’ when it comes to adaptation planning. This is also observed elsewhere by
646 Porter and Demeritt (In Press) who talk about how the Environment Agency’s ‘Flood
647 Map’ acts as an ‘obligatory passage point’ that all decisions for flood planning should be
648 filtered through.

649 This raises several implications for the science-policy interface. Firstly, as Meyer
650 (2011) noted, expectations between what is wanted as a return from an investment and

651 what can be delivered from that investment needs to be managed more closely to ensure
652 the subsequent science is used in the best means possible and be deemed usable.
653 Secondly, although utilization of the same science allows for national consistency and
654 helps makes governance easier, if every decision-maker utilizes the same information
655 source the safety net created by diversity in information sources is removed because *if* the
656 science turns out to be categorically incorrect everyone who utilized it will be affected;
657 meaning in the case of the UK, the entire national infrastructure will be particularly
658 vulnerable to changes in climate (cf. Hall 2007). This highlights the dangers of placing
659 too much emphasis on using one scientific source of information as a standalone to
660 support policy decisions (Brown 2009), and the need to continually state that other
661 sources must be used in conjunction with specialist information like UKCP09. These
662 observations are consistent with an emerging literature that emphasizes robust decision-
663 making – predicated on identifying strategies immune to wide ranges of uncertainty –
664 over a predict and optimize approach (Dessai *et al.* 2009; Lempert and Groves 2010;
665 Wilby and Dessai 2010).

666 7. Conclusion

667 Advances in scientific understanding, greater acknowledgement of uncertainty and
668 greater user input have helped install credibility and legitimacy in UKCP09. However,
669 this has come at the expense of saliency for decision-makers because saliency is
670 dependent upon both their ability to understand and interpret the science and also on what
671 information they require. Consequently, although UKCP09 is perceived by decision-
672 makers to represent a common framework for assessing future climate changes because
673 of its credibility and legitimacy, paradoxically, it is not actually a common framework for

674 all sectors to utilize as UKCP09 lacks saliency for some decision-makers. This saliency
675 disconnect is in part caused by an increase of users (and range of uses) due to societal
676 pressures and regulatory requirements to plan for a changing climate.

677 Our findings suggest that we may have reached a limit to the utility of national
678 climate projections. While they have played important roles in the past (pedagogic and
679 motivational for example; see Hulme and Dessai 2008a; 2008b), they lack salience for
680 adaptation decision-making (amongst many users), which is the primary reason UKCP09
681 was constructed. This raises the question of whether climate scenarios can truly ever be
682 constructed through mode 2/post-normal science? This study suggests that the large
683 number of users of climate projections now make this very difficult. Furthermore, it hints
684 at a move from the post-normal science realm to the applied consultancy domain (cf.
685 Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993) . This is evident from the important role played by boundary
686 organizations and knowledge brokerage. Hence, one way to enhance the salience of
687 science for adaptation decision-making could be through the tailoring of climate and
688 climate impact projections to particular adaptation contexts or problems. One of the
689 drawbacks of this approach is that national consistency may be lost, which could be
690 beneficial as a diversity of approaches may prevent maladaptation if only one set of
691 projections is used (and proved incorrect). Attempts at increasingly saliency are likely to
692 have impacts on credibility and legitimacy. This study has demonstrated that ultimately,
693 the production of usable science requires a careful balancing act between the knowledge
694 system criteria.

695 One of the limitations of our study is the small number of stakeholders who
696 participated. This makes it difficult to extrapolate wider conclusions for each stakeholder

697 group's perception. It is likely that with a larger sample, greater variation in perception
698 would emerge. For example, we would expect credibility to erode slightly as we are
699 aware of disagreements amongst the academic community, for example, one of the
700 reviewers of UKCP09 was concerned that the results were "stretching the ability of
701 current climate science" (Heffernan, 2009). Further in-depth, ethnographic work with a
702 wide range of stakeholders is necessary to better understand how climate science is
703 currently informing decision-making and how this process can be improved for greater
704 societal benefits.

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713

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906 **List of Figures**

907 FIG. 1. A diagram showing sectors' of organizations' approached to participate in the
908 questionnaire survey. The survey universe consists of sectors' (organizations') that were
909 Defra mandated and those that were not mandated to produce an adaptation report.
910 Sectors underlined and highlighted in bold participated in the study.

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
912 TABLE 1. Summary of the interviewee participant population

Interviewee	Area of expertise	Employer sector	Relationship to UKCP09
Decision-maker A	Network modeling specialist	Water	Moderate user
Decision-maker B	Climate change coordinator	Environment	Low user
Decision-maker C	Facilities and strategy team specialist	Health and social care	Low user
Decision-maker D	Policy advisor on climate risk	Environment	Moderate user
Decision-maker E	Environment specialist	Water	Moderate user
Decision-maker F	Waste and carbon management	Water	Moderate user
Decision-maker G	Climate change advisor	Water	Moderate user
Decision-maker H	Regulatory compliance specialist	Energy	Low user
Decision-maker I	Natural sciences	Transport	Low user
Decision-maker J	Asset engineer and sustainability	Water	Moderate user
Decision-maker K	Environment officer	Transport	Moderate user
Knowledge producer A	Climate modeling	Higher education	Directly involved in development
Knowledge producer B	Climate modeling	Government related	Directly involved in development
Knowledge producer C	Marine physics and climate modeling	Research	Directly involved in development
Knowledge producer D	Advising decision-and-policy-making	Higher education	Related expert (used UKCP09)
Knowledge producer E	Climate change, flood and coastal risk management	Regulator	User panel and review group member
Knowledge producer F	Sea-level and land motion change	Higher education	Review group member
Knowledge producer G	Climate science communication advisor	Government related	Steering group member

Knowledge producer H	Climate change modeling	Regulator	User panel member
Knowledge producer I	Climate change adaptation	Higher education	Related expert (used UKCP09)
Knowledge producer J	Coastal management and sea level change	Higher education	Contributed to development
Knowledge producer K	Senior scientist	Government related	Steering group, Review group and User Panel member
Knowledge translator A	Sustainability advisor	Consultancy: engineering	User panel member
Knowledge translator B	Climate change advisor	Consultancy: engineering and environment	Provides advice to others
Knowledge translator C	Impacts and economic costs of climate change, and the costs and benefits of adaptation	Higher Education and Consultancy: climate change, environmental and economic policy advice	Provides advice to others
Knowledge translator D	Statistical analysis and science communication	Consultancy: climate adaptation scientist	Provides advice to others

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